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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- ZONING-APPLICABILITY OF MUNICIPAL
ZONING LAWS TO STATE AGENCIES-The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has held that the State Bureau of Correction may not locate
one of its facilities in a municipality in disregard of a local zoning
ordinance since the state legislature did not clearly intend that the
Bureau of Correction should prevail in such a conflict of authority.
City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607
(1976).
On April 22, 1974, the Bureau of Correction of the Pennsylvania
Department of Justice (appellee) entered into a five-year lease with
owners of a building located on South Aiken Avenue in Pittsburgh.
The property was to be used as a pre-release center for women
convicts.' On July 9, 1974, appellant City of Pittsburgh filed an
action in equity in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania2 seek-
ing to enjoin the use of the premises as a pre-release center because
no certificate of occupancy had been secured from the city, 3 nor had
the Governor of Pennsylvania approved the location of the center.,
The Commonwealth contended it was not subject to the zoning
requirements of municipal subdivisions and therefore was not re-
quired to obtain a zoning permit.
The commonwealth court issued -a preliminary injunction, but
upon the Governor's approval of the location of the pre-release cen-
ter, the court rescinded the injunction.' In a subsequent adjudica-
tion on the merits, the commonwealth court held that as a matter
of Pennsylvania law, state agencies were not subject to the zoning
ordinances of municipalities The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed. It first noted that Commonwealth agencies no longer enjoy
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1051 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), authorizes the Bureau of
Correction to establish, with the approval of the Governor, "such prisoner pre-release centers
at such locations throughout the Commonwealth as it may deem necessary to carry out
effective prisoner pre-release programs therefrom."
2. Since this suit was a civil proceeding against the Commonwealth, it was properly
initiated in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 211.401
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
3. Occupancy permits are required for, among others things, a new use or a change in the
use of land. PITTSBURGH, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 3002-3 (1958).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. 468 Pa. 174, 177 n.2, 360 A.2d 607, 609 n.2 (1976).
6. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 226, 341 A.2d 228 (1975).
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an absolute exemption from a municipality's zoning requirements.7
Rather, the court viewed this case as involving a conflict between a
local municipality and a government bureau, both agents of the
state, both attempting to exercise their legislatively created pow-
ers.8 The conflict in authority was resolved by examining the two
enabling acts to determine whether the legislature intended that the
power of the Bureau of Correction to locate pre-release centers
should override municipal zoning power.' There being no explicit
language in the agency's enabling act evincing a clear intent to
override local zoning ordinances, the state agency was held to be
subject to the requirements of the city's zoning regulations.' 0
Justice Eagen, writing for three justices, dissented." He agreed
with the majority that the proper method of analysis was to deter-
mine whether the legislators intended to grant to the Bureau of
Correction the power to locate pre-release centers regardless of local
zoning ordinances.'" The dissenters concluded, however, that the
Bureau of Correction's enabling legislation did expressly confer au-
thority to override the local zoning provisions, in language providing
for the construction of pre-release centers "at such locations
throughout the Commonwealth as it may deem necessary."'" Justice
Eagen believed that once this legislative intent was discerned, the
benefactors of the express grant were not subject to the City's zoning
7. 468 Pa. at 178-79, 360 A.2d at 609-10.
8. To support the majority's contention that conflicts such as the one in City of Pittsburgh
should be resolved solely on the basis of legislative intent, Justice Roberts relied on a New
Jersey Supreme Court case, Rutgers State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972).
Piluso involved a conflict between a township zoning ordinance which permitted the construc-
tion of dormitories and other housing facilities, provided such facilities did not exceed five
hundred units, and a state statute granting the university a high degree of self government.
Rutgers was refused a building permit to build three hundred seventy-four units in excess of
the statutory maximum. Although the decision was in favor of Rutgers, Justice Hall of the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the true test of immunity in this area is that of legisla-
tive intent, giving respect to the particular agency or function involved. According to the
Rutgers court, although rarely specifically expressed, legislative intent is generally derived
from a consideration of many factors, the most obvious ones being the nature and scope of
the instrumentality seeking immunity, the type of function or land use involved, the extent
of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have
upon the enterprise concerned, and the impact upon legitimate local interests. Id. at 152-53,
286 A.2d at 702.
9. 468 Pa. at 178, 360 A.2d at 609.
10. Id. at 185-86, 360 A.2d at 613.
11. Chief Justice Jones and Justice Nix joined in Justice Eagen's dissent.
12. 468 Pa. at 192, 360 A.2d at 617 (dissenting opinion).
13. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
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restrictions, whether or not there was a conflict between the Bu-
reau's statutory grant of authority and a city's zoning power.'4
Until recent years, Pennsylvania courts had resolved conflicts
between various arms of the state with the premise that absent an
explicit statutory provision to the contrary, state agents "higher up"
in the state political system were not subject to restraints by lesser
governmental bodies." Applying this principle, it was clear that the
zoning power of a municipality could not be enforced against the
Commonwealth unless the municipality's enabling act so provided.
Early court opinions treated such conflicts in authority as mere
controversies between local municipalities and the Commonwealth
and since the Commonwealth occupied a superior position in the
political hierarchy, the Commonwealth prevailed.'" The City of
Pittsburgh court emphasized that it was fallacious to rely on artifi-
14. 468 Pa. at 192, 360 A.2d at 617 (dissenting opinion).
15. See General State Auth. v. Borough of Moosic, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 270, 310 A.2d 91
(1973) (sovereign immunity from zoning ordinances allowed the establishment of a minimum
security correctional institution by the Pennsylvania Department of Justice); Township of
Lower Allen v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 272, 310 A.2d 90 (1973) (denying injunc-
tion to prevent the building of a trailer camp on property owned by the Commonwealth in
an area zoned residential). Other cases have also granted immunity from local zoning ordi-
nances where the service sought to be provided by the public entity was "governmental"
rather than "proprietary." E.g., Harward v. Haas, 59 Pa. D. & C. 658 (Dauphin Co. 1947)
(Commonwealth not bound by township zoning ordinance, which prevents the operation of a
state teachers college). When the political unit was attempting to perform an essential func-
tion, that function was deemed "governmental"; where the function was less essential and
alternatives existed, the argument for immunity was less compelling and the function was
deemed "proprietary." The problem with this distinction was that the balancing of competing
public and private interests which should determine questions of governmental immunity was
abandoned in favor of a convenient mechanical application of labels. See General State Auth.
v. Borough of Moosic, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 270, 310 A.2d 91 (1973). Further, it is often difficult
to determine whether a function is "governmental" or "proprietary." Compare Pruett v.
Dayton, 39 Del. Ch. 537, 168 A.2d 543 (1961) (garbage disposal "governmental"), with
O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh, 239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y.S. 173 (1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y.
582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935) (garbage disposal "proprietary").
Other courts have reasoned that where a state agency or authority has the power of eminent
domain, the exercise of that power renders the agency or authority immune from zoning
regulations, since the uninhibited right of the agency or authority to condemn property must
not be limited by zoning laws. See Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960) (city desiring
to construct a sewage disposal plant used power of eminent domain to override county zoning
ordinance). However, zoning ordinances limit, but do not eliminate, the power of a govern-
mental authority to locate its facility. Often the authority can obtain a variance or can locate
in an area which is zoned to meet its needs. See generally Comment, Governmental Immunity
from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1971); Comment, The Inapplicability
of Municipal Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Uses, 19 SRAcusE L. REv. 698 (1968).
16. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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cial labels such as the governmental-proprietary distinction 7 in ra-
tionalizing this exemption of government agencies from local zoning
ordinances. Both the majority and dissenting justices agreed that
local municipalities, like state agencies and various state authori-
ties, are agents of the Commonwealth. They reasoned that to resolve
the conflict in favor of the authority simply because it is exercising
its power as a "state agency" begs the question of which state-
created authority should prevail.
The court concluded that the act authorizing the establishment
of the pre-release center lacked explicit zoning exemption language,
and that the Bureau's enabling act gave only general authorization
for the establishment of pre-release centers without providing for
specific site selection."8 As a result, the court found that the legisla-
ture had not intended to exempt the Bureau of Correction from the
City's zoning regulations. 9 Justice Roberts supported his decision
in favor of the City by applying a canon of statutory construction
which provides that whenever local zoning regulations impose
stricter standards than are required in any other seemingly conflict-
ing statute, the provisions of the local zoning law shall prevail." He
determined that the City's zoning ordinance set more stringent
standards than did the statute relied upon by the Bureau of Correc-
tions for the regulation of land and building use.
In Wilkins burg-Penn Joint Water Authority v. Churchill,"' a case
relied on by the City of Pittsburgh majority, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court considered whether a joint water authority was im-
mune from a borough's zoning power. As in City of Pittsburgh, the
supreme court in Wilkinsburg examined the appropriate zoning
enabling act,2 compared it with the statutory grant of authority to
17. 468 Pa. at 178-79 n.4, 360 A.2d at 609 n.4. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
18. 468 Pa. at 183-84, 360 A.2d at 612.
19. The section of the second class city zoning law entitled, "Regulating Use of Land and
Buildings" provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the
community, cities of the second class are hereby empowered to regulate, restrict or
determine, the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures,
. .. the density of population, and the location, use and occupancy of buildings,
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25051 (Purdon 1957).
20. Id. § 25058.
21. 417 Pa. 93, 207 A.2d 905 (1965).
22. See 417 Pa. at 96 n.3, 207 A.2d at 907 n.3.
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the water authority,23 and held that as a matter of law the property
owned by the water authority was not immune -from the zoning
power of the borough. The water authority contended that the Mu-
nicipal Authorities Act, which gave the agency the exclusive power
to determine the scope of its services, necessarily implied that prop-
erty owned by the governmental entity was exempt from local zon-
ing regulations." The court reasoned that the borough was not
"determining" the authority's services by enforcing the zoning laws
since the initial service decisions remained with the water authority;
the word "exclusively" used in the Municipal Authorities Act was
not meant to vest unregulated discretion in that administrative
body, but was simply intended to make it clear that the water auth-
ority, not some other agency, was to determine the necessary ser-
vices.25 The borough code, on the other hand, established a compre-
hensive plan designed to provide for, among other things, an ade-
quate water supply for borough residents. The court found this
provision to be more comprehensive than the Municipal Authorities
Act, 2 and concluded that the objectives of both statutes could be
23. The provisions relied upon by the authority grant it the power "to determine by itself
exclusively the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable
service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served . PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306
B(h) (Purdon Supp. 1177-1978).
24. The plaintiff planned to construct a five hundred thousand gallon water tank in the
borough but was denied a permit and a variance. Claiming a need for a water tank on the
land, the water authority sought judicial relief. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the propriety of the location of the water tank was not at issue. The parties "have only the
power and authority granted them by enabling statutory legislation." 417 Pa. 93, 100, 207
A.2d 905, 909 (1965), citing White Oak Borough Auth. Appeal, 372 Pa. 424, 93 A.2d 437
(1953). In examining the Borough Code, Justice Cohen observed that nowhere in the Code
was the property owned by a water authority expressly exempted and that, unless an excep-
tion is provided by an inference either from the Borough Code, the Municipal Authorities Act
or other legislation, the water authority's property is subject to the jurisdiction of the bor-
ough's zoning laws. 417 Pa. at 100, 207 A.2d at 909.
25. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
26. 417 Pa. at 101, 207 A.2d at 909. This reasoning is misleading. The interpretation was
first enunciated in Yezioro v. North Fayette County Mun. Auth., 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 271, 164
A.2d 129 (1960), where the issue was whether a common pleas court had the power to review
a municipal water authority's determination of the adequacy and reasonableness of water
service to the residents of a township. The authority argued that since the Municipal Authori-
ties Act gave it the power exclusively to determine its services, the common pleas court was
without authority to review its determination. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that
by use of the words "by itself exclusively," the legislature intended to make it clear that the
authority, and not some other instrumentality, controlled the initial determination of its
services. Like all other determinations of fact, however, the adequacy of the water authority's
decision was a matter for judicial scrutiny. Id. at 285, 164 A.2d at 137. Given a statute
granting a municipal authority the power to "determine by itself exclusively" the location of
its services, the Yezioro case implies that the authority's decision is limited only in that it is
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secured only if the authority's land was subject to the borough's
zoning power.Y
The City of Pittsburgh court used the Wilkinsburg case as sup-
portive of the proposition that cases involving conflicting powers of
public bodies should be resolved by balancing each authority's en-
abling legislation and applying canons of statutory construction.
More importantly, Justice Roberts adopted from Wilkinsburg the
somewhat limited interpretation of "as it may deem necessary" and
used it to counter the Commonwealth's claim that the phrase "as
it may deem necessary" in the Bureau of Correction's enabling legis-
lation gave it the power to determine the location of its facilities
without regard for the city's zoning regulations.
Like Wilkinsburg, Pemberton Appeal" was decided solely on an
examination of the pertinent enabling statutes and also was consid-
ered by the City of Pittsburgh court. In Pemberton, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the statutory grant of authority to
a school district l9 unequivocally vested power in the school board to
determine the location of a new school. In the court's view, the
zoning act evidenced no overriding intent by the legislature to give
townships the general power to enact zoning regulations affecting
schools.30 Allowing a township to prevent a school board from build-
ing a school at a desired location would discount the express lan-
subject to the court's review. There is no indication that the authority's decision is subject
to the restriction of zoning regulations or other non-judicial declarations.
27. The Municipal Authorities Act and the borough's zoning power have the same general
objectives: to promote the health, safety and welfare of the people. The Municipal Authorities
Act provides that "(tihe purpose and intent of this act [is] to benefit the people of the
Commonwealth, by. . . increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity. . . . PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306(A) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Similarly, the Borough Code provided
that "[sluch regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan . . . to
promote health and the general welfare . . . . PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 48203 (Purdon 1966)
(repealed by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11201 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978)). See id. § 10105
(purpose of Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code).
The Municipal Authorities Act, on the other hand, states that the authority must provide
"adequate, safe and reasonable service." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306B(h) (Purdon Supp.
1977-1978). In the Wilkinsburg court's view, this did not require the authority to make its
service determination with due regard to the comprehensive objectives of zoning, even if it
had the ability to do so. 417 Pa. at 103, 207 A.2d at 910.
28. Id. at 163, 207 A.2d at 910.
29. 434 Pa. 249, 252 A.2d 597 (1969).
30. The language of the Public School Code provides in part: "The location and amount
of any real estate required by any school district for school purposes shall be determined by
the board of school directors of such district." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-702 (Purdon 1962).
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guage of the Public School Code.3 Significantly, the Pemberton
court, in support of its decision for the school board, relied on a
canon of statutory construction: where two statutory provisions are
irreconcilable, a general provision in a statute shall yield to a con-
flicting- provision in the same or another law.3" Since the court deter-
mined that the township's power to regulate was general, and the
power of the school district to choose the location of schools was
specific,33 the school district's grant of authority had priority over
the borough's regulatory powers.
Although the Wilkinsburg and Pemberton cases both provided
the supreme court with a method of analysis, neither decision or-
dered the outcome of the City of Pittsburgh case. The statute relied
upon by the water authority in Wilkinsburg gave the agency the
power to determine the services and improvements necessary to
provide adequate services,3" but said nothing of its ability to deter-
mine the exact location of those services and improvements. The
relevant zoning enabling act in Wilkinsburg, on the other hand, em-
powered the borough to regulate and restrict the construction or
use of the buildings and provided no exceptions for governmental
agencies.35 Both statutes could be given full effect only by subject-
ing the water authority to the borough's zoning enabling law. In
Pemberton, the Pennsylvania General Assembly expressly provided
that the location of any school real estate was a matter strictly
reserved to the local school district;36 any attempted intervention by
a local borough or township would be ineffectual.37
31. See 434 Pa. at 252-56, 252 A.2d at 599-600.
32. Id. at 254, 252 A.2d at 599.
33. Id. at 253, 252 A.2d at 599.
34. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306B(h) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
35. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
36. "The location and amount of any real estate required by any school district for school
purposes shall be determined by the board of school directors of such district . PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-702 (Purdon 1962).
37. The township seeking to enforce its zoning laws rested its case on School Dist. of Phila.
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 (1965), which held that a school
district must comply with a first class city's off-street parking regulations. It was apparent
to the Pemberton court that the city's parking regulations had no effect on the school dis-
trict's statutory power to determine the location of its schools. After distinguishing the
Philadelphia case, the Pemberton court was faced with a statute which could not have been
more explicit in its delegation of power to the school district to determine the location of its
schools. The decision in favor of the school district was a necessary one since the location of
schools is uniquely a matter of school district concern. 434 Pa. at 256, 252 A.2d at 600.
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In contrast, the statute in City of Pittsburgh8 fell somewhere
between the express legislative grant of immunity to the school
district in Pemberton and the judicially construed supremacy of the
borough zoning law in Wilkinsburg. The statute in City of
Pittsburgh gave the Bureau of Correction the power to establish pre-
release centers "at such locations throughout the Commonwealth as
it may deem necessary to carry out effective prisoner pre-release
programs therefrom."39 The court was uncertain whether "as it may
deem necessary" was meant to be read with the preceding language,
suggesting an intent to override local zoning ordinances, or whether
that phrase was to be read in conjunction with language following,
"to carry out effective prisoner pre-release programs therefrom,"
which arguably expresses no such intent. If the latter approach was
correct, the canon of construction favoring the more specific statute
could be applied, the more specific statute being the zoning law
which expressly provided that the city must plan and supervise the
comprehensive development of its land.4 The court concluded that
the phrase "as it may deem necessary" was probably inserted to
make it clear that the Bureau of Correction, and not some other arm
of the Commonwealth, would select the sites for the prisoner pre-
release centers.41 The statute therefore stood as a general grant of
authority to establish pre-release centers at various locations
throughout the Commonwealth, but subject to the exclusion of local
zoning ordinances.
The court's construction of the phrase "as it may deem neces-
sary" may have been incorrect. As was discussed earlier,42 statutes
containing that phrase have been interpreted to mean that munici-
38. See note 1 supra.
39. Id.
40. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25058 (Purdon 1957).
41. 468 Pa. at 183 n.7, 360 A.2d at 612 n.7. In other grants of authority, the state legisla-
ture has said exactly where certain state institutions were to be built. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 61, § 912 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) (Correctional Diagnostic and Classification Center
must be located at state institution); id. § 545-1 (Pennsylvania Department of Welfare ex-
pressly instructed to select a tract of land to be purchased by the Department of Property
and Supplies or by the General State Authority, to be used as an industrial school for
prisoners); id. § 732 (location of meeting place for advisory board for prison industrial farms
and workhouses to be determined by respective county commissioners); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 1519.32 (Purdon 1962) (Pennsylvania Department of Property and Supplies entrusted
with the task of determining desirable sights for institutions for the care of persons afflicted
with mental disorders).
42, See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
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pal authorities having power to determine the location of services
could do so subject only to judicial scrutiny, not to the requirements
of local zoning ordinances. The City of Pittsburgh court ignored this
existing case law and further limited the power of a state agency by
declaring that its power to locate is subject not only to judicial
review but to local zoning regulations as well.43
In reaching this conclusion, the City of Pittsburgh court was less
than clear in its method of analysis. The court seemed eager to
adopt the rule of law that, absent statutory language evincing a
clear intent to override local zoning regulations, state agencies and
authorities must abide by local zoning laws." Arguably, in doing so,
the court lost sight of the real issue before it. The Bureau of Correc-
tion claimed a right of authority based on a statute; the issue was
whether that statute did, in fact, indicate an intent to override the
zoning regulation.
It is obvious from a reading of the majority and dissenting opin-
ions that there were two plausible interpretations of the Bureau of
Correction's enabling statute. Justice Roberts apparently conceded
this fact and stated that he would look to the intent of the legisla-
ture, the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and the circum-
stances of the particular case to determine which statutory power
must prevail." The court was expected to apply these three factors
and balance the comprehensive interests of a city's need to provide
for the health, safety, and welfare of its residents through zoning
ordinances, against the Bureau's need to place institutions where
most needed. The majority, however, seemed to limit its analysis to
a literal interpretation of the conflicting statutory directives and a
general application of canons of construction.46 Conceivably, had
the court weighed the policy considerations and determined legisla-
tive intent as it purported to do it might have reached a different
result.
43. 468 Pa. at 183 n.7, 360 A.2d at 612 n.7.
44. Id. at 184-85, 360 A.2d at 613.
45. The court observed:
When there is an apparent conflict in the use of such powers we must look to the
intent of the Legislature to determine which exercise of authority is to prevail. . ..
[W]e must examine the nature of the legislative grant, the purpose for which it was
created, and the facts of the individual case to determine which statutory power must
prevail.
Id. at 182, 360 A.2d at 612. This process of balancing statutory purposes gives the greatest
deference to enactments of state legislatures. See id. at 182 n.6., 360 A.2d at 612 n.6.
46. See id. at 186, 360 A.2d at 614.
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Justice Roberts could find no legislative history47 to indicate how
conflicts with local zoning regulations were to be resolved. It does
not follow, however, that the absence of legislative history left the
court without guidance.4 8 Justice Eagen, in his dissent, discussed
the policy reasons which the legislature might have considered in
passing the act creating the Bureau of Correction. In his opinion, the
purpose of the statute was to ensure that effective prisoner pre-
release programs would be implemented.49 Crucial in the success of
pre-release programs is the environment in which rehabilitation is
fostered. The choice of the location most conducive to this rehabili-
tation should therefore rest with the Bureau of Correction, accord-
ing to Justice Eagen, since it possessed the necessary expertise to
make the determination. For the legislature to have intended the
Bureau of Correction to determine its services and at the same time
be subject to zoning ordinances would, in effect, deprive the Bureau
of a most effective weapon in rehabilitating its prisoners.
The effect of the City of Pittsburgh decision seems clear. Unless
a Commonwealth bureau or agency is acting under a statute similar
to the school code in Pemberton, in which the legislature expressly
states that the agency's power to locate shall not be limited, it will,
in all cases, be subject to local zoning laws. This may prove to be
an unfortunate result. Many enabling statutes, passed prior to
Wilkinsburg, in a time when governmental immunity from local
zoning regulations was a law in Pennsylvania,0 do not clearly evi-
dence a legislative intent that the agency be beyond the control of
local zoning laws. In these instances, legislative intent may now be
frustrated by the City of Pittsburgh precedent.
The legislature, of course, could eliminate the confusion by
amending existing statutes and more carefully drafting future bills.
If the Pennsylvania legislature indeed did decide that correctional
and other special interest agencies should not be subject to the
requirements of local zoning laws, City of Pittsburgh will require the
47. The act giving the Bureau of Correction its authority was introduced in the Pennsyl-
vania Senate. The Pennsylvania Legislative Journal did not publish debates on this bill. See
PA. LEGIS. J., 152d Sess. 1453 (1968) (Senate).
48. See id; cf. 360 A.2d at 616 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
49. Id. Justice Eagen believed that the statute relied upon by the Bureau of Correction
expressly granted it the power to override local zoning laws. 360 A.2d at 616 (dissenting
opinion).
50. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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General Assembly to return to those statutes and express that intent
in more explicit terms.
This solution may not be feasible in all cases, however. Legislators
may find it politically inexpedient to support zoning enabling legis-
lation which makes it clear to local municipalities that state agen-
cies and authorities can override their zoning laws. Legislators who
support such laws may fear loss of support since their constituents
might not readily accept such reinforcement of the state legisla-
ture's authority over matters affecting local government; legislation
giving the state the exclusive power to determine the location of
prisons, rehabilitation centers, and other unattractive facilities is
bound to create public opposition. State legislators, aware of the
need to accord such authority to state agencies and authorities,
therefore may be unwilling to assume the responsibility for such
legislation, and may therefore enact ambiguously worded legislation
which does not readily lend itself to canons of construction. When
such a possibility exists, courts should be cognizant not only of
precise statutory language and application of these canons, but also
should include in their analysis an examination of the purpose for
which the conflicting statutes were enacted and the circumstances
of the case before it. Only in this manner can cases such as City of
Pittsburgh, where state penal interests and the strong local interest
in a secure living environment collide, be satisfactorily resolved.
Charles Lenns
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